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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7

JURORS: RIGHT TO PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.-A trial court's denial of the
plaintiff's statutory right' to exercise a peremptory challenge was declared to be
error by the California Supreme Court, but not reversible error.
In the case of Buckley v. Chadwick,2 a wrongful death action, the trial judge
informed counsel for both parties that once a peremptory challenge is passed as
to any juror in the box, that challenge is waived, in so far as those jurors are
concerned. A peremptory challenge could thereafter only be exercised to a juror
called into the box after the waiver.
The error in question occurred after the jury box was filled. Plaintiffs exercised
four peremptory challenges and then passed a peremptory challenge to the jurors
then in the box. The defendant challenged a juror, and a new venireman entered
the box. Plaintiffs then sought to peremptorily challenge a juror who had been in
the box at the time plaintiffs passed their fifth peremptory. This was disallowed by
the trial court on the ground that the juror had been in the box at the time plaintiffs
had passed a peremptory, and under the pretrial instructions this amounted to a
waiver to all except new veniremen entering to replace those challenged by the
defendant.
The majority of the California Supreme Court conceded that the plaintiffs were
entitled to exercise this peremptory challenge, and that the pretrial instruction was
contrary to section 601 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it read at the time of
the trial:
a .. Each side is entitled to six peremptory challenges. If no peremptory challenges
are taken until the panel is full, they must be taken by the sides alternately, commencing
with the plaintiff. . . . Each side shall be entitled to have the panel full before exercising
any peremptory challenge ...

In addition this abridgement was declared to be beyond the broad power of
a judge to control the proceedings before him, and in so stating the court cited
an early California Supreme Court case, which heretofore had never been overruled.
Silcox v. Lang, based on similar facts, stated:
"The right to challenge a certain number of jurors peremptorily is absolute under
the statute; and the fact that a party had once passed the jury, including the juror
not cut off this right. The right may be exercised
afterward sought to be challenged, does
3
at any time before the juror is sworn."

However, despite the Silcox case and the recent passage of an amendment to
section 601, which seems to reaffirm the decision, the court decided that the failure
to make an affirmative showing of bias or prejudice on the part of the jurors, or
that the plaintiffs did not have a fair and impartial trial, amounted to a mere technical
error in procedure which could be cured by an application of article VI, section
4 , of the California Constitution, which reads:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case . . . for any error
as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including
the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice.

To term this denial a matter of procedure appears to be in conflict with the
Silcox case and other California decisions in which the right to a peremptory challenge was said to be: a substantial right; 4 one that is absolute; 5 an inseparable and
1

CALIF. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 601.

Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal.2d -,
288 P.2d 12 (1955).
' Silcox v. Lang, 78 Cal. 118, 123, 20 Pac. 297, 300 (1889).
'People v. Diaz, 105 Cal.App.2d 690, 696, 234 P.2d 300, 304 (1951).
' People v. Helm, 152 Cal. 532, 535, 93 Pac. 99, 101 (1907) ; Silcox v. Lang, 78 Cal. 118, 123,
20 Pac. 297, 300 (1889).
2

NOTES

May, 1956]

inalienable part of the constitutional right to a trial by jury.6 The denial of this
right, in People v. Diaz,7 was said to be not a mere matter of procedure, but an
absolute and substantial right which renders article VI, section 4/2, inapplicable.
In view of the above decisions the application here of article VI, section 4 ,
does not appear to be within the intended purpose of the enactment as reflected in
People v. O'Bryan, the first Supreme Court case to consider the constitutional section.
There the court said:
"We do not understand that the amendment in question was designed to repeal or

abrogate the guaranties accorded . . . by other parts of the same constitution or to overthrow all statutory rules of procedure ....

"It is an essential part of justice that questions of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defend-

ants shall be respected."s
The court also said that not every invasion of even a constitutional right necessarily required a reversal, but the court must decide if the error is reflected in the
jury's verdict.
The paramount evil sought to be corrected, in the minds of the court, was the
situation requiring reversal for technical errors or omissions, even though, if the
court had been able to look at the evidence, they would have been able to ascertain
that a fair trial had been granted. The court went on to state that the important
change in the new section was to alter the rule that prejudice was to be presumed
from error.
It does not appear that the broad provisions of the article were ever meant to
cure deviations from accepted rules of pleading and procedure which are essential
to a fair trial, for example: the trial court's biased comments on the evidence to
the jury, 9 limiting the right to examine jurors,' 0 and abridgement of a defendant's
right to a jury trial."
That the right to peremptory challenge is included within this list of deviations
12
from accepted rules of procedure is evidenced by the case of People v. O'Connor.
The defendant was denied the right to exercise the authorized number of peremptory
challenges, and it was contended that article VI, section 4 , applied. The court said
it could not reasonably be held that this section is so broad as to permit the trial
court to disregard the usual form of jury trial and adopt a new and entirely different
manner from that recognized by law.
The right to a peremptory challenge is treated with equal strength whether in
a civil or criminal case; in both it is termed an absolute right'13 There seems
therefore to be no logical basis for applying one line of reasoning in criminal cases,
as illustrated in the O'Connor opinion, and an entirely different form of reasoning
in a civil matter, as the case under discussion implies.
Hence, by the rule applied in People v. O'Connor, the constitutional section,
although it relates to procedure, should have no application where there has been
an abridgement of a statutory right that has been termed absolute.
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